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Dynamic Spectrum Auctions and Trading: Systems and
Algorithms
-- Xia
Zhou, Prof. Heather Zheng, Collaborators: Prof. Subhash Suri
We propose to use short-term dynamic spectrum auctions to distribute spectrum driven by dynamic user demand and willingness-to-pay. Our goal is to develop efficient, real-time (eBay like) and economic-robust spectrum auction and trading systems. The challenges include (1) how to clear auctions in real-time while addressing interference constraints, (2) how to achieve economic robustness and prevent market manipulations while addressing interference constraints, (3) how to maintain spectrum efficiency, all at the same time. We have made significant progress on this project (see our DySPAN07, MobiCom 08, INFOCOM 2009 and WSDR 08 papers.)
Dynamic Spectrum Auctions and Trading: Systems and
Algorithms
-- Xia
Zhou, Prof. Heather Zheng, Collaborators: Prof. Subhash SuriWe propose to use short-term dynamic spectrum auctions to distribute spectrum driven by dynamic user demand and willingness-to-pay. Our goal is to develop efficient, real-time (eBay like) and economic-robust spectrum auction and trading systems. The challenges include (1) how to clear auctions in real-time while addressing interference constraints, (2) how to achieve economic robustness and prevent market manipulations while addressing interference constraints, (3) how to maintain spectrum efficiency, all at the same time. We have made significant progress on this project (see our DySPAN07, MobiCom 08, INFOCOM 2009 and WSDR 08 papers.)
- NEW! Strategy-Proof Spectrum Trading using Double Auctions: We recently developed TRUST, a spectrum trading algorithm where spectrum owners and users can trade spectrum dynamically on-the-fly. TRUST implements the trading using truthful double spectrum auctions while enabling spatial-reuse to improve utilization. Additional details can be found in our INFOCOM 2009 paper.
- NEW! eBay in the Sky -- Efficient and Truthful Spectrum Auctions: Unlike goods (e.g. paintings and bonds) in conventional auctions, spectrum is reusable among bidders and must be allocated under complex combinatorial interference constraints. We show that existing truthful designs, when applied to spectrum auctions, either fail or become computationally intractable. Our MobiCom 08 paper proposed VERITAS, a generate framework to design efficient and truthful spectrum auctions. It is highly flexible and competitive, allowing the auctioneer to optimize its desired utility and providing bidders with diverse bidding and demand formats. Our paper was among the 4 finalists of the Best Paper Award at MobiCom.
- Real-time
Auction Clearing: Our work in DySPAN07
and Com-Networks
presented a fast auction clearing mechanism that can process 4000
requests in 90 seconds using a standard desktop. Our work can address
both uniform and non-uniform pricing, and different bidding mechanisms.
We show that non-uniform (often referred to as descriminatory) pricing
mechanism is the key to revenue-maximizing and efficient spectrum
auctions. Our paper received the Best
Student Paper Award in DySPAN07.
- Traffic-aware Spectrum Auctions: We examine the performance of on-demand spectrum auctions as well as the impact of bidding behaviors using measured AP traffic traces. This preliminary work verifies the benefits of short-term spectrum auctions (which match spectrum allocation to dynamic traffic demand). It also shows that bids should depend heavily on traffic behaviors. See our WSDR08 paper for details.